广东省深圳市人民政府


深圳市人民政府令
第151号

　　《关于修改〈深圳市气象灾害预警信号发布规定〉的决定》已经市政府四届二十四次常务会议审议通过，现予发布，自颁布之日起施行。根据本《决定》修订的《深圳市气象灾害预警信号发布规定》重新发布施行。

市长许宗衡
二○○六年五月九日

关于修改《深圳市气象灾害预警信号发布规定》的决定

　　为贯彻执行中国气象局《突发气象灾害预警信号发布试行办法》，保证气象灾害预警信号的持续、统一，进一步完善《深圳市气象灾害预警信号发布规定》（以下简称《规定》），现决定对《规定》作如下修改：
　　一、删去的内容
　　（一）删除第一条的“《广东省台风、暴雨、寒冷预警信号发布规定》”字样。
　　（二）第六条、第七条和第十五条。
　　二、修改的内容
　　（一）第二条修改为：“本规定所称气象灾害预警信号（以下简称预警信号）分为台风、暴雨、高温、寒冷、大雾、灰霾、大风、冰雹、雷电、干旱、火险等十一类。按照灾害的严重性和紧急程度，预警信号总体上分为四级，分别代表一般、较重、严重和特别严重的气象灾害，依次用蓝色、黄色、橙色和红色标识。”
　　（二）第四条修改为：“本市电视台、广播电台、12121气象专线等媒体应当在收到市气象台直接提供的预警信号后15分钟内向公众播发。任何单位不得向公众传播非气象台直接提供的预警信号和灾害性天气警报。
　　基础电信运营企业应当确保通过其公用通信网络传递的预警信号传递畅通。”
　　（三）第五条修改为：“市气象主管部门负责预警信号发布的管理工作，制定预警预案，并会同有关部门做好防灾预警和防灾减灾的宣传工作。市、区、街道各有关部门应制定相应防御预案，组织实施部门联动和社会响应。”
　　（四）第八条修改为：“台风预警信号
　　台风预警信号分为五级，分别以白色、蓝色、黄色、橙色和红色表示。
　　（一）台风白色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：48小时内可能受热带气旋影响。
　　防御措施：
　　注意了解热带气旋的最新情况，警惕热带气旋对当地的影响。
　　（二）台风蓝色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：24小时内可能或者已经受热带气旋影响，平均风力6级以上。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．做好防风准备，并及时通知户外、高空、港口及海上作业人员；
　　 2．妥善安置易受大风影响的室外物品。
　　（三）台风黄色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：24小时内可能或者已经受热带气旋影响，平均风力8级以上。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．幼儿园、托儿所和中小学停课，学校和托幼机构应指派专人负责保护到校的学生和入园（托）的儿童；
　　 2．进入防风状态，停止高空、水上等户外作业，船舶到避风场所避风；
　　 3．危险地带人员撤离，停止露天集体活动，立即疏散人员；
　　 4．各职能部门做好相关防御准备，临时避险场所开放。
　　（四）台风橙色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：12小时内可能或者已经受热带气旋影响，平均风力10级以上。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．进入紧急防风状态，市民应留在室内或到安全场所避风；
　　 2．加固港口设施，防止船只走锚、搁浅和碰撞。
　　（五）台风红色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：6小时内可能或者已经受热带气旋影响，平均风力12级以上。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．建议全市停业（抢险救灾、医疗及保障居民基本生活必需的公共交通、供水、供电、燃气供应等特殊行业除外）；
　　 2．有关部门准备启动抢险应急方案。”
　　（五）第九条修改为：“暴雨预警信号
　　暴雨预警信号分三级，分别以黄色、橙色、红色表示。
　　（一）暴雨黄色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：6小时内可能或者已经受暴雨影响。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．及时通知易受暴雨影响的户外工作人员；
　　 2．有关部门密切注意暴雨可能造成的城市内涝、山体滑坡等灾害。
　　（二）暴雨橙色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：3小时内可能或者已经受暴雨影响，降雨量50毫米以上。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．低洼、易受水浸地区注意做好防涝工作；
　　 2．建议暂停易受暴雨侵害的户外作业。
　　（三）暴雨红色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：3小时内可能或者已经受暴雨影响，降雨量100毫米以上。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．幼儿园、托儿所和中小学停课，学校和托幼机构应指派专人负责保护到校的学生和入园（托）的儿童；
　　 2．临时避险场所开放，危险地带人员撤离；
　　 3．各职能部门做好相关防御准备。”
　　（六）第十条修改为：“寒冷预警信号
　　寒冷预警信号分三级，分别以黄色、橙色、红色表示。
　　（一）寒冷黄色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：24小时内可能或者已经受冷空气影响，最低气温降至10℃以下。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．市民要注意添衣保暖，并留意市气象台发布的最新降温信息；
　　 2．各职能部门做好相关防御准备，临时避寒场所开放。
　　（二）寒冷橙色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：24小时内可能或者已经受冷空气影响，最低气温降至5℃以下。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．及时通知户外工作人员采取防寒措施；
　　 2．各职能部门应当采取措施，为确需援助人员提供必要帮助。
　　（三）寒冷红色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：24小时内可能或者已经受冷空气影响，最低气温降至0℃以下。
　　防御措施：
　　有关部门和单位采取措施，预防可能出现的霜冻、结冰等寒害。”
　　（七）第十一条修改为：“雷电预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：2小时内可能或者已经受雷电影响。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．建议停止户外易燃、易爆危险作业；
　　 2．市民应尽量停留在安全地方。”
　　（八）第十二条修改为：“大风预警信号
　　大风（指除台风以外的大风，主要是东北季风和西南季风系统等引起的大风或强对流系统引起的短时大风）预警信号分四级，分别以蓝色、黄色、橙色、红色表示。
　　（一）大风蓝色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：6小时内可能或者已经受大风影响，平均风力6级以上。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．做好防风准备，注意了解大风最新消息；
　　 2．妥善安置易受大风影响的室外物品。
　　（二）大风黄色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：6小时内可能或者已经受大风影响，平均风力8级以上。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．停止高空、水上等户外作业，危险地带人员撤离；
　　 2．船舶到避风场所避风。
　　（三）大风橙色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：2小时内可能或者已经受大风影响，平均风力10级以上。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．机场、码头、港口等单位应当采取措施，注意防风；
　　 2．市民应留在室内或到安全场所避风。
　　（四）大风红色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：2小时内可能或已经受大风影响，平均风力12级以上。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．进入特别紧急防风状态，建议停课、停业（抢险救灾、医疗及保障居民基本生活必需的公共交通、供水、供电、燃气供应等特殊行业除外）；
　　 2．有关部门准备启动抢险应急方案。”
　　（九）第十三条修改为：“高温预警信号
　　高温预警信号分三级，分别以黄色、橙色、红色表示。
　　（一）高温黄色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：24小时内可能或者已经受暖空气影响，最高气温升至35℃以上。
　　防御措施：
　　避免长时间户外或者高温条件下的作业。
　　（二）高温橙色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：24小时内可能或者已经受暖空气影响，最高气温升至37℃以上。
　　防御措施：
　　建议12—15时停止户外或者高温条件下作业，并缩短连续作业时间。
　　（三）高温红色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：24小时内可能或者已经受暖空气影响，最高气温升至40℃以上。
　　防御措施：
　　建议停止户外或者高温条件下作业（抢险救灾、医疗及保障居民基本生活必需的公共交通、供水、供电、燃气供应等特殊行业除外），优先保障生活用电，临时避暑场所开放。”
　　（十）第十四条修改为：“违反本规定，有下列行为之一的，由市气象主管部门责令改正，给予警告，可以并处五万元以下的罚款；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任：
　　（一）非法向公众发布气象灾害预警信号、公众气象预报的；
　　（二）电视台、广播电台、互联网等传播媒体向公众传播非市气象台直接提供的气象灾害预警信号、公众气象预报的。”
　　（十一）第十六条修改为：“本规定自颁布之日起施行。2001年6月29日深圳市人民政府发布的《深圳市气象灾害预警信号发布规定》同时废止。”
　　三、增加的内容
　　（一）增加一条为第二条：“在本市行政区域及本市管辖的海域内发布气象灾害预警信号，应当遵守本规定。”
　　（二）增加一条为第十一条：“大雾预警信号
　　大雾预警信号分三级，分别以黄色、橙色和红色表示。
　　（一）大雾黄色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：12小时内可能或者已经受浓雾影响，能见度降至500米以内。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．驾驶人员小心驾驶；
　　 2．机场、高速公路、轮渡码头等单位采取必要措施保证交通安全。
　　（二）大雾橙色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：6小时内可能或者已经受浓雾影响，能见度降至200米以内。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．空气质量明显降低，市民注意采取适当防护措施；
　　 2．有关部门采取必要措施，确保交通安全。
　　（三）大雾红色预警信号
　　图标：
　　含义：2小时内可能或者已经受浓雾影响，能见度降至50米以内。
　　防御措施：
　　建议机场暂停飞机起降，高速公路和轮渡暂时封闭或者停航。”
　　（三）增加一条为第十二条：“灰霾预警信号”
　　图标：
　　含义：12小时内可能或者已经受严重灰霾天气影响。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．驾驶人员小心驾驶；
　　 2．空气质量明显降低，居民需适当防护。”
　　（四）增加一条为第十四条：“冰雹预警信号”
　　图标：
　　含义：2小时内可能或者已经受冰雹影响。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．妥善安置易受冰雹影响的室外物品；
　　 2．市民应留在室内或到安全场所暂避。”
　　（五）增加一条为第十六条：“干旱预警信号”
　　图标：
　　含义：连续3个月累积雨量比历史同期少（汛期偏少30%，非汛期偏少50%）且旱情将持续。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．市民应积极节水；
　　 2．各级政府和有关部门启动抗旱措施；
　　 3．气象部门适时进行人工增雨作业。”
　　（六）增加一条为第十七条：“火险预警信号”
　　图标：
　　含义：未来24小时空气干燥，相对湿度≤50%，易发生火灾。
　　防御措施：
　　 1．市民居家、外出注意防火；
　　 2．加大巡山护林力度，严格管制野外火源。”
　　根据修改情况，《规定》条文序号重新编排。

Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System


Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:

“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”

In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”



【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.



List of References

1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.